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Chapter 10. Beyond national ‘varieties’: Public-service contracting in 
comparative perspective 
 
Ian Greer, Ian Greenwood and Mark Stuart 
 
In Ian Cunningham and Philip James (eds) Voluntary organizations and public 
service delivery. London: Routledge, Forthcoming, 2010. 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we will explore how work in contracted-out public services, 
including that in the voluntary sector, maps onto the broader international 
political economy of work.  Comparative scholars often write about society 
correcting the excesses of the market, and it is hard to imagine a more relevant 
phenomenon to this than the voluntary sector.  Yet this sector is itself subject 
to market forces, ironically perhaps, due to its ever-closer relationship with the 
state.  Our study of employment in welfare-to-work services in the UK and 
Germany, whose findings are summarised below, shows how this relationship 
works and what its effects on workers are. 
 
Comparative employment relations theory tends to rely on a static ‘Varieties 
of Capitalism’ view (Hall and Soskice, 2001) or more dynamic accounts of 
institutional change (Streeck and Thelen, 2005).  Like us, these theorists are 
interested in the interplay between state, society, and market; unlike us, they 
are primarily focused on export-oriented manufacturing and comparisons at 
the national level.  We are building on literature that looks at the political 
process of market making and the within-country inequalities it creates (Lillie, 
2010), especially in the service industries, public and private, that account for 
most work (Bosch and Weinkopf, 2008; Doellgast, Batt, and Sørensen, 2009). 
 
Our argument is that as market logic becomes pervasive in the governance of 
public services, it is increasingly the funding regimes, rather than the 
industrial relations systems, that determine the course of labour-management 
relations.  Where this has manifested itself as increasingly cost- and target-
driven commissioning behaviour, we see a shift towards more precarious 
forms of work and an erosion of trade union power.  Statutory protections such 
as transfer-of-undertakings legislation and institutions of worker 
representation are not well placed to compensate for these trends, either in the 
UK or Germany.  More important seems to be the success or failure of 
organisations to manage relations with their funders, to avoid or succeed in 
cut-throat competition.  
 
We begin by introducing our argument in light of the literature on public-
service governance and standard accounts of comparative political economy.  
Second, we compare employment relations in welfare-to-work services in the 
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UK and Germany.  We conclude with a discussion of marketisation in these 
two countries, its limits, and its social effects. 
 
Marketisation and the public-service workplace 
 
Much theorising on international-comparative employment relations is derived 
from the Anglo-German comparison.  While Britain rolled back its worker 
protections in the 1980s, Germany retained a strong regime of collective 
bargaining, workplace-level co-determination, and employment-protection 
legislation.  These institutional divergences produced in Germany higher 
levels of equality and a manufacturing economy that performed better in world 
markets.  Meanwhile, German public services resisted UK-style ‘New Public 
Management’ reforms, partly due to a complex federal government structure 
protected by a written constitution (Knuth, 2009), partly due to an entrenched 
tradition of ‘subsidarity’ that ensured a strong role for the voluntary sector 
(Seibel 1990).   
 
In several ways, however, Germany is becoming like the UK.  Under the red-
green government after 1998, market mechanisms emerged governing a wide 
range of public services (Hipp and Warner, 2008; Keune et al, 2008).  In 
postal, telecommunications, and health care services, new competitors 
emerged that only rarely adhered to public-sector pay deals.  Incumbent firms 
– such as the privatised Deutsche Telekom or the municipal hospitals – created 
new subsidiaries which outsourced services with lower pay (Böhlke et al, 
2010; Doellgast, 2009). As the agencies that remained in the public sector 
gained more autonomy and began to derecognise collective bargaining, the 
states (Länder) withdrew from centralised bargaining, and a new collective 
agreement introduced low-wage groups and ‘escape clauses’.   This coincided 
with the Hartz Reforms, which deregulated low-wage precarious work in the 
private sector, expanded means testing in the welfare state, and introduced 
new work-for-benefit schemes that subsidised low-wage work in the voluntary 
sector.   Without a statutory minimum wage, these reforms led to a massive 
increase in inequality; between 1995 and 2005, the share of low-wage work 
increased from 15% to 22%, similar to the British level (Bosch and Weinkopf, 
2008).   
 
The causes of these inequalities can be seen in the dynamics of the voluntary 
sector, where much of Germany’s low-wage workforce is employed.  
Germany’s voluntary sector is rooted in a centuries-old tradition of 
subsidiarity that reinforced in the 20th century by the rise of the social-
democratic movement and neighbourhood-based nonprofits often connected to 
the ‘new social movements’ (Eick et al, 2004; Bode 2003).  The introduction 
of market mechanisms regulating the flow of resources to them, however, has 
changed what they need to do in order to survive, including their employment 
policies.  Looking at marketization allows us to use resource dependence – an 
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underused concept in comparative employment relations research – for 
leverage in explaining why market-based change has led to greater inequality 
in Germany. 
 
For managers of nonprofits, funding is of central importance, and a recurring 
theme in the academic literature on them is resource dependence.  Of course, 
funding is not everything.  Organisations have to be close to the 
neighbourhoods that supply clients, staff, and political support, and often they 
are put in this position by a history of place-based advocacy work that creates 
a sense of purpose or mission (Marwell, 2004; Galaskiewicz et al, 2004).  But 
funding does matter, because non-profits depend on it (Smith and Lipsky, 
1993).  Contracting undermines some organisations; for others, it creates 
incentives for others to adapt, through new administrative functions and a 
change in focus and culture.  As a result, many organisations – especially 
(former) social movements of the poor and unemployed – struggle to avoid 
‘losing their soul’ in the process (Sanger, 2004; Eick et al, 2004).   
 
Usually in public-services contracting there is one buyer (the commissioning 
body) and many sellers (providers).  Under these conditions, power relations 
are asymmetrical in favour of the buyer, but the latter is not omnipotent.  The 
buyer of services needs providers to deliver in order to hit their own targets, 
and they are therefore as interested in providers’ ability to do the work as they 
are in extracting ‘value for money’.  This problem can be acute for the buyer 
when there is one provider that fulfils a unique function, fostering a kind of 
‘resource interdependence’ (Saidel, 2001).  One way that buyers of services 
can address this is through ‘relational contracting’, in which the buyer of the 
services communicates with providers throughout the process of devising 
programmes, procuring the work, carrying out projects, and evaluating them 
(Cunningham 2008).  
 
This power relation has implications for employment relations.  While 
reducing costs is not the only reason for contracting, it is a common and 
important one, and has implications for wage setting.  In areas subject to 
intense cost-based contracting, employers who pay according to collective 
bargaining may lose bids to lower-paying competitors (Enggruber and 
Mergner, 2007).  Even in a strong system of industrial relations like that of 
Germany, privatisation can disrupt collective bargaining and lead to the 
creation of low-pay groups, especially among new hires (Böhlke et al 2010).  
Contracting can bring groups of workers into public service that have no 
access to union representation, and even solidarity within the same union can 
be difficult if workers have different employers (Marchington et al. 2005).    
 
Contracting can affect job security and tenure in at least two ways.  On the one 
hand, make-work schemes can create financial incentives for voluntary 
organisations to augment the workforce through subsidised temporary low-
4 
 
wage positions (Eick et al, 2005).  On the other hand, the starting and stopping 
of funding streams can make it difficult to employ people over long periods of 
time, in some especially volatile areas the vast majority of staff is employed 
on a freelance basis (Enggruber and Mergner, 2007).  That both of these 
previously quoted studies are from Germany shows that many of these 
employers have found ways around employment protection legislation. 
 
The effect of contracting on the employment relationship seems not only to 
affect employees’ well-being; contracting seems also to affect workers’ world-
views, their loyalty to their employer, and their views about their occupations.   
A ‘contracting culture’ often emerges that affects the motivations and attitudes 
of those previously employed in charitable and public-sector work.  For some 
workers, this may lead to dissatisfaction (Cunningham, 2001) and for others 
new financial inducements for creativity or entrepreneurship (Considine, 
2001).  Hebson et al (2003) argue that, while ‘working in the public interest’ 
remains important to the overall workforce, conflicts engendered by the 
contracting process are undermining this ethos among managers.  In the 
Public-Private Partnerships they studied, the former premise of the labour-
management relationship – an exchange of working conditions for worker 
commitment – were eroding, along with employers’ ability to maintain those 
conditions.  The importance of money, combined with job insecurity and 
inequality, are important features of the culture of this ‘welfare market’ (Bode, 
2008).   
 
To summarize, this literature allows us to hypothesize that contracting has 
exacerbated inequality in the workforce, made work increasingly precarious, 
and eroded traditional notions of ‘public-service’ work.   
 
The welfare-to-work sector in the UK and Germany 
 
In 2007-8 we spoke to around 150 people involved in the welfare-to-work 
sector, as policymakers, civil servants, managers, front-line workers, trade-
union representatives, community activists, or clients.  Our goal was to 
examine welfare-to-work, not in terms of individual policies or the ideologies 
or rationales behind them, but in terms of working conditions of front-line 
staff and the possible effects on client outcomes.  We began by speaking with 
the organizers of small trade union and voluntary sector projects aiming to 
make people in poor communities – mainly South Wales, East Germany, and 
parts of Leeds and Cologne – more ‘employable’.  As it became clear that we 
were looking at a sector, we began speaking to the civil servants responsible 
for designing programmes and managing contracts, as well as front-line staff 
and managers in larger public-sector and for-profit providers.   
 
Below we discuss preliminary findings from this study.  Because it is unusual 
to discuss welfare-to-work as a sector, we will say what it is, including the 
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basic structure of funding and provision, followed by a brief description of 
employment relations under these pressures.   
  
Funding and provision  
 
We define the sector functionally, as a diverse group of organisations that 
works with people on welfare benefits to put them in, or bring them closer to, 
work.  Almost all of these organisations’ income comes from the state, and the 
main commissioning bodies are the public employment services.  The sums 
involved are considerable.  In 2006-7 the UK’s Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP) spent £2.8b on personnel and £1.1b on contracted out 
provision; the comparable figures for 2006 at the German Bundesagentur für 
Arbeit (BA) are €4.2b and €2.2b, respectively.   
 
The German phrase for this policy is fördern und fordern: placing demands 
on, and providing supports to, recipients of welfare benefits. In both countries, 
the policy includes a mixture of punitive policies (new conditions for 
receiving benefits and sanctions for not meeting these conditions) and supports 
(spending on ‘activation’ programmes, such as the British New Deals, 
Pathways, and Future Jobs Fund).  In addition to central government spending, 
further funding comes from a range of other agencies at the local, regional, 
and European levels.  In recognition of the rootedness of unemployment and 
poverty in the social dynamics of specific neighbourhoods, welfare-to-work 
policies funded at any of these levels can have a strong local dimension (Finn, 
2000), with funding often targeted to local government and charities with a 
‘track record’ in serving specific communities.  These funding streams pay 
providers to undertake the following tasks: 
   
• Job placement, along with the payment of benefits, is the most 
traditional area of activity.  Under the 2003 Hartz reforms in Germany, 
the BA is responsible for the short-term unemployed, while most 
locales have Arbeitsgemeinschaften, ARGEs, that are joint ventures 
between the locally run Sozialämter (benefits offices) and BA-run 
Arbeitsämter (employment offices) for the long-term unemployed.  
The U.K. has a simpler structure, due to the recent restructuring of 
employment services in which DWP placed in-house front-line 
provision in the hands of Job Centre Plus (JCP).  In addition, 
temporary staffing agencies and local nonprofits have carved out 
various niches for themselves as contractors for the BA or JCP. 
• Training includes everything from basic literacy and numeracy to 
apprenticeships and formal qualifications.  While the DWP and BA 
fund some of this work, the larger funders are the education ministries 
(in the UK via the Learning and Skills Councils).  Upgrading the skills 
of the unemployed is done in further education colleges (in Germany, 
the Volkshochschulen) and by a wide range of private and voluntary 
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sector providers, many of whom in the UK have special units dedicated 
to advising the unemployed and reaching out to ‘hard-to-reach 
communities’.  
• Advice, counseling and guidance is a second area linked explicitly with 
employability and involves helping people overcome barriers to work 
such as debt, lack of transportation, or access to public services (i.e. to 
cope with drug or alcohol abuse or mental illness).  Often this work 
overlaps with advocacy, with some of the providers concerned also, for 
example, with representing the unemployed when there is a 
disagreement with the BA or JCP.  This area of work is in both 
countries dominated by the non-profit sector: trade union unemployed 
workers’ centres, associations of Muslim women, and neighbourhood-
based legal aid services, for example, are all found in both countries.   
• Small-business startups can involve advice, business incubators, or 
other supports for new activity, or converting existing under-the-table 
work into legitimate small businesses.  In Germany, the most famous 
example was the ‘Ich-AG’ initiative in the Hartz reforms, and similar 
thinking is behind the UK government’s Local Economic Growth 
Initiative (LEGI).  These programmes are often run by business 
chambers and companies that span the private and non-profit sectors, 
such as social enterprises.  The spectrum of public funding bodies is 
extremely broad in both countries.   
• Make-work schemes, such as the New Deals and one-euro jobs1 are 
politically very visible and involve massive amounts of money.  
Subsidised by the state, providers find or create job placements, 
organise training and counselling for participants, and pay some sort of 
compensation.  In Germany, the notion of subsidising short-term low-
wage work in the private sector is opposed by the business community 
as an illegitimate form of market manipulation.  As a result, the law 
requires of all projects additionality (Zusätlichkeit – projects may not 
replace work already planned) and social benefit (Gemeinnützigkeit – 
the work cannot be for-profit), making them the preserve of the 
voluntary sector.  In Britain, where there are fewer objections to 
subsidising low-wage work, analogous schemes enjoy political support 
across the political spectrum and are delivered by for-profit, non-profit 
and public sector organisations.   
 
The largest providers do not specialise in one or another of the services 
mentioned above.  Some organisations, such as the Yorkshire-based 
                                                           
1
 The ‘one-euro job’ was created by the Hartz reforms.  It is the commonly used designation 
for ‘work opportunities’ (Arbeitsgelegeheiten [AGH]) attached to a benefit top-up 
(Mehraufwandsentschädigung) of 1-2 euros per hour.  Before these reforms, most make-work 
schemes (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmassnahmen) lasted longer and were paid according to 
collective agreements.  In 2006 the BA reported 805,000 entries into such schemes, of which 
about 90% were AGH; these numbers have remained stable since. 
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multinational A4e, have grown up specifically to deliver welfare-to-work 
programmes with a broad service offering aimed specifically at the outcome of 
job placements.  Other organisations, not established to deliver employment-
related services, have built employability into a broader pre-existing offering 
of social services.  For example, Germany’s nationwide ‘welfare associations’, 
the Catholic Caritas, Protestant Diakonie, and Social-Democratic 
Arbeiterwohlfahrt, are among Germany’s largest employers.  Social workers 
within these organizations may provide counselling to the unemployed and 
place them in schemes in affiliated hospitals.  In the UK, smaller organisations 
with access to those deemed by job centres ‘hard-to-reach’, such as homeless 
shelters or ethnic associations in deprived neighbourhoods, tend to receive 
money to pay for more specialized work such as counselling, childcare, 
training, or job placements.  These functions are then linked to the public 
sector through client referrals. 
   
The BA and DWP are not the only bodies that fund services to put specific 
kinds of people to work.  The EU also funds, through the European Regional 
Development (or Structural) Fund, Social Fund, and Globalization Adjustment 
Fund, ‘active’ measures for the unemployed.  State and local government are 
similarly involved due to their role in neighbourhood regeneration or poor 
relief.  Finally, many other public bodies view ‘activating’ the unemployed as 
complementary to their remit, for example, to prevent released prisoners from 
re-offending, to reduce anti-social behaviour in housing estates, or to bring 
women or minorities into occupations where they are under-represented.  
Large providers draw on several of these funding streams simultaneously, 
while small providers may be dependent exclusively on one. 
 
These funding streams are managed in different ways.  One approach can be 
labelled ‘co-production’.  This is common with pilot projects, in which local 
government targets a specific neighbourhood or client group, but with little 
indication of which goals are realistic.  Rather than subjecting the project to 
proscriptive bidding according to standard criteria, it is developed jointly by a 
government agency and one or more charities.  Many German make-work 
schemes fit this description.  In Cologne (pop. 970,000), for example, there are 
30 agencies organising make-work projects, organized within 15 consortia.  
While the funding decision has to be made objectively according to fixed 
criteria, these criteria are developed by local government staff based on their 
knowledge of the local providers.  While competition has to be advertised EU-
wide, the ‘public benefit’ criterion creates clear advantages for non-profits.  In 
the UK, similar arrangements are common in local government, where non-
profits carry out some of the work that, for whatever reason, cannot be carried 
out in-house.  In extreme cases, the charity’s staff is entirely seconded by the 
local authority.   
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Other bodies use more formalised market-based procurement arrangements.  
The DWP, for example, governs provision in a way that is simultaneously 
centralised and marketised (Wiggan, 2009).  Bidding is based on relatively 
clear and objective criteria that can be replicated on a wide scale, and payment 
subject to standardised measures of performance.  For many of their large 
New Deal Programmes and (more recently) Pathways to Work Programmes 
for the Disabled, JCP has been centralising its procurement procedures and 
moving to larger contracts.  A typical large contract covers a ‘sub-region’ such 
as West Yorkshire (population 2.1m), and is one of a few delivering the same 
programme across the whole country. This procurement process is centralised, 
and DWP staff assess bids from around the country in a process designed to be 
objective and not susceptible to local political influence.  A variation on this 
theme is the dominant practice at the BA, which has a similarly sealed-off 
decision-making process at the ‘regional’ level (i.e. one or more Länder), a 
focus on objective outcomes (mainly cost), but shorter running times of 
programmes (as short as six months).   
 
The latter set of contracting relations has several features that distinguish them 
from ‘co-production’.  The first is its cyclical nature. After a given contract 
runs its course, the work goes back out to bid, and a well-performing 
organisation can lose the contract if a competitor writes a better bid.  The 
second is payment by results.  For job-placement services, organisations are 
usually paid once when a client finds a job and again once the client has been 
employed for some time.  A third is the process through which the funding 
decision is made.  Set objective criteria such as cost dominate, and informal 
influence and local knowledge are inadmissible.  Finally, the latter pattern of 
contracting is complex and therefore favours firms and charities with 
specialised grant-writing and contract-management functions.   
 
Employment relations 
 
Institutionalized worker protections were not devised for a world of 
contracting, and the workings of some funding streams make them ineffective.  
Looking across the welfare-to-work sector, we see organizations with very 
different employment arrangements sometimes pit against each other in 
intense price-based competition. While both countries have  well-organised 
representative structures in the public sector, neither has structures that 
encompass the whole range of welfare-to-work providers.   
 
Trade unions have influence in the organisations where they have large 
numbers of members.  Elsewhere they are either completely absent or their 
role comes down to influencing government policy and using the courts to 
enforce workers’ individual employment rights.  In both countries there are 
separate union structures for the public employment service (PCS and ver.di 
FB04), charities (UNITE, UNISON, FB03 and FB05), local government 
9 
 
(UNISON and FB07), and training (e.g. UCU, NUT, GEW, and FB05) 2, and 
employer organisation is similarly fragmented.  As a result, the picture of 
workplace-level worker participation, pay determination, and worker turnover 
reflect a disorganised pattern of employment relations. 
 
This can be seen in Germany, which is well known for its strong worker 
participation rights in the workplace.  Germany has four separate legal 
frameworks that govern within-workplace participation in welfare-to-work 
provision.  Worker representatives have different rights, depending on whether 
they work for churches, state and local government, the central government 
(i.e. the BA), and the private sector.  For example, variations exist in terms of 
which areas are subject to mandatory co-determination: the private-sector 
framework gives works councillors the most rights, and the church framework 
the fewest; the public sector frameworks are in between.  Within the ARGEs, 
there are two separate frameworks in a single organisation, state and central 
government Personalvertretungsgesetze.  Moreover, in practice, issues that 
according to law should be approved locally are in fact decided centrally by 
the BA’s works council and management and implemented with little local 
consultation.  Outside of the public sector, works councils in the organisations 
we visited were present in the welfare associations, but – as in the rest of the 
economy – absent from smaller non-profit and for-profit providers, or indeed 
those employing large numbers of freelancers. 
   
In the UK, the situation is similarly unequal, with very little in the way of lay 
trade union structures outside the public sector, and full-time officials 
appearing primarily to sort out conflicts that could end in an employment 
tribunal case.  Indeed, here, statutory rights for individuals are probably even 
more decisive in regulating the workplace.  Most providers emerged when 
unions were already in sharp decline, and so never had strong in-workplace 
structures; with the passage of new anti-discrimination, minimum wage, 
working time, and other laws, employment tribunals have became a more 
important forum.  In fact, in interviews in Leeds, trade unionists indicated that 
they had their hands full dealing with derecognition threats and employment 
tribunals, especially around discrimination and transfers of undertakings. They 
did not, in contrast, play much of a role in the day-to-day handling of issues 
like work intensity or skilling, and we did not hear of any organisations that 
had invoked the recent ‘works council’ regulations on the provision of 
information and consultation to employees.  
 
Without encompassing collective bargaining to maintain standards across the 
various employers, a huge diversity has emerged in the terms and conditions 
                                                           
2
 PCS stands for Public and Commercial Services Union, UCU stands for the Universities and 
Colleges Union, GEW stands for Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft, and ver.di’s 
stands for vereinte Dienstleistungen.  The latter is broken into autonomous numbered 
Fachbereiche (FB).  UNITE and UNISON are not short for anything. 
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of employment.  The most obvious gulf is between the public sector and its 
contractors.  The former have strong collective bargaining, while the latter 
have weak or no collective bargaining.  However, while this situation 
regarding contractors could facilitate a ‘race to the bottom’, it need not: 
depending on the performance of organisations and the character of the 
funding regimes, wages can be as high as, or higher than, in the public sector. 
    
Perhaps the clearest example of a ‘race to the bottom’ in either country is 
Germany’s further education system.  Providers, here operate in a harsh 
contracting regime managed at the national and regional levels.  In some areas, 
the BA promotes intense, cost-based competition, and in others dictates 
reductions in payments per trainee; in one extreme case in Cologne, a provider 
won a bid by offering €15 per contact-hour.  Specialised training 
organisations, in turn, cope with the uncertainty associated with contracting by 
relying heavily on freelancers.   
 
Some of the contractors with local government that we interviewed in Cologne 
did follow the national public-sector collective agreement.  Due to recent 
reforms to public sector bargaining, however, they reported increasing 
difficulty in following these guidelines.  There are increasing points of 
divergence in public sector collective agreements, driven by states and sectors 
that have made separate deals and by ‘opening clauses’ allowing lower wage 
groups in the event of economic hardship.  Furthermore, one-euro jobs have 
created a vast reservoir of low-wage work for the German voluntary sector not 
covered by collective agreements or other employment protections.  Thus, for  
political, economic and institutional reasons, German non-profits are moving 
rapidly away from their tradition of recognising the public-sector pay 
framework. 
 
In the UK the picture in this area is rather mixed.  Although the country has an 
analogous split between the public sector and its contractors, commentators 
have painted a more complex picture of bargaining in the voluntary sector 
(e.g. Cunningham 2008).  Despite competitive pressures, overall wages in 
Britain in recent years have been pushed up by the tight labour market of the 
past decade and the rapid expansion of welfare-to-work as a sector.  (This does 
not mean that in all occupations comparable pay with the public sector has 
been maintained; it may be a rise in inequality between different occupations, 
depending on the level of demand on the labour market and the expansion of 
performance-related pay.)   Those organisations that still use public sector 
collective agreements tend to be those local non-profits closely tied into local 
government and operating under stable funding regimes. Regarding the 
situation in the for-profit sector, none of the organisations we visited 
recognised unions, and they tended to have lower base pay than the public 
sector.  We also saw instances of performance-based pay, based on client job 
outcomes, reflecting the criteria for payment set by the commissioning bodies.   
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Given the uncertainty generated by contracting, the most important statutory 
worker protection is that governing transfers of undertakings.  If contracting 
inevitably forces providers to hire and fire as contracts and contractors come 
and go, it is worth asking how workers are protected when they switch 
employers. 
   
In Germany, while transfers are regulated by the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, 
these protections expire a year after a transfer, and we have yet to see a case in 
our research where these rules have been invoked.  Part of the reason for this 
is that those organisations that need to hire and fire the most – training 
providers subject to the short-term cost-based contracting of the BA’s central 
contracting arm – use freelance workers not covered by the law.  However, it 
also reflects the fact that other non-profits use employment arrangements, such 
as fixed-term contracts, one-euro jobs.  The BA uses the temporary agency 
Vivento, which employs workers laid off from elsewhere in the public sector.  
 
In the UK, the TUPE regulations, which confer rights to workers in cases 
where work is transferred to another organisation, are similar to those in 
German law and are often invoked when one organisation loses its contract 
and another organisation gets the work.  However, it can be questionable 
whether TUPE is really applicable, if it is unclear whether the new programme 
is the same as the old one and whose job was funded by the old contract.  In 
the case of the loss of Leeds City Council’s New Deal contract, the council 
recommended 45 employees for transfer, while the new contractor said it only 
had work for 13 of them.  Despite their protected status, most of the 
transferred workers left soon afterwards because they disapproved of the 
profit-driven model of provision.  
 
Finally, there is a question about the emerging culture in this sector.  This is 
probably where there is the clearest divide between public, private, and 
voluntary sectors, a divide that is not just a function of worker representation, 
but also of organisational size and origins.  Large public sector bodies that 
have evolved continuously over the post war era have a different feel from 
non-profits set up by local community activists.  There is considerable 
evidence from our interviews that individuals in these sectors are motivated by 
different things – some prefer security, others flexibility, while some are 
motivated by wealth accumulation.  These differences reflect different 
biographies, as unionised public sector workers, as activists agitating against 
local redevelopment, or as entrepreneurs seeking to make a profit.  These 
people often distrust their counterparts in other sectors, and people who have 
moved between sectors tend to strongly prefer one to the other.  There is also 
some evidence of change within the voluntary sector, as in the numerous 
charities in our UK sample creating trading arms, and the shift in German 
welfare associations away from hiring law graduates, towards hiring entry-
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level managers with business degrees (Betriebswirtschaftslehre).  However, 
there is still little evidence that these sectoral differences translate into more or 
less of an orientation towards the quality of service, as opposed to following 
directives or chasing money. 
 
Despite the ‘varieties’ story standard in comparative institutional research, 
what emerges from the above analysis is that these two national landscapes of 
provision have developed a similarly high degree of variation and inequality.  
There is no worker or employer organisation covering welfare-to-work 
provision as a whole, and outside of the public sector it is largely up to 
workers and managers within individual organisations to work out how to 
cope with the sector’s developments.  It would be a mistake to say that 
workers are passive in coping with these changes or that strong worker 
participation within an organisation does not make a difference.  However, it 
is equally untrue to say that they have participation mechanisms that can 
counter the uncertainty created by contracting. Insofar as national variations 
do exist, these are primarily the product, not of collective worker and 
employer organisations, but of the details of statutory regulation and 
individual employer strategies.  While many German employers, especially in 
the public sector, accept institutionalized norms, such as co-determination, 
employment protection and collective bargaining, others find ways to avoid 
them, for example by using freelancers.   
  
The marketisation of the voluntary sector: effects and limits 
 
Above we sketched the different institutions of public-service governance and 
their effects in the workplace.  Despite differences, neither country had unions 
or statutory worker protections that protected the workforce as a whole from 
intensified competition and the restructuring that resulted.  Consequently, new 
forms of competition built into the evolving funding rules put intense 
pressures on employers to reduce costs, the cyclical nature of bidding 
undermined job security, and the bureaucratic, money-driven nature of 
contracting affected the culture of organizations.   
 
One result of trends in contracting seems to be the concentration of provision 
in the hands of ever fewer for-profit organisations; for workers, this will have 
a mixed effect.  Large organisations are more likely to have professional 
human resource management and are better able to transfer employees 
internally in response to lost contracts.  The problem of regulating between-
organization transfers of workers could be further reduced if large contractors 
managed fluctuations in the volume of work by subcontracting with incumbent 
providers, rather than forcing their competitors out of business by shifting the 
services in house.  Larger contracts could also lead to more relational 
contracting: in recognition of the problems of contract management, JobCentre 
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Plus recently has restructured its procurement unit to assign officers to the 30 
largest contractors.   
 
On the other hand, these shifts will in some ways heighten the uncertainty.  
Because local organisations and governments find it harder to win regional or 
sub-regional contracts than the big, national players, they will be increasingly 
dependent on large for-profit firms for contracts.  Given the complexity of 
contracting, there is no guarantee that even small providers who perform well 
will survive the intense pressures of contracting.  The different models of 
provision and cultures of management at successful organizations could make 
it difficult for employees to transfer between sectors, as seen in the case of 
New Deal provision in Leeds.   
 
One question this research raises is how to prevent contracting from wiping 
out local non-profit provision and pushing skilled workers out of the sector.    
In the UK, especially, there is a lucrative market for large organisations 
capable of operating across large swathes of country; these organizations are 
also winning contracts in Germany, France, and elsewhere.   
 
One option is to get around the fundraising savvy of large providers by 
creating loopholes are in procurement legislation, such as the German 
‘Gemeinnützigkeit’ principle in the make-work schemes or the old British 
practice of giving grants rather than contracts. Turning down the intensity of 
competition by making contracting subject to the judgment of local actors 
would undoubtedly have a stabilising effect in the workplace.  With more 
secure sources of funding and solid relationships with commissioning bodies, 
small voluntary sector organisations would be more likely to recognise trade 
unions and invest in training.  Removing the existential threat to effective 
projects would have obvious advantages for clients.   
 
Bottling up competition after years of privatisation and contracting will be 
difficult and open to legal and political challenge.  This structure has been 
created more for political reasons than due to evidence of its effectiveness 
(Davies 2006), and change will be divisive in the provider camp.  Local 
protection violates the intent of EU contracting laws to open all large contracts 
from member states to service providers from across the EU.  Local protection 
also runs contrary to the interests of large providers, who can argue that they 
are best placed to provide the low-cost, standardised provision needed for 
large-scale national labour-market programmes.   
 
A more politically feasible response would be to build institutions to 
compensate for this market-based tendency to marginalise small providers.  In 
the UK, the government created an Office for the Third Sector in 2006 to 
‘build capacity’ and ‘rationalise’ the supports that already existed.  In practice, 
this created funding streams for organisations responsible for back office 
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support, including fundraising, accounting and human resources, as well as 
bodies responsible for representing the sector’s interests at the national and 
local levels.  The idea here was to help organisations adapt to the market and 
to make small organisations fit for competition through the upgrading or 
carrying out their accounting and human resource functions.  These enhanced 
infrastructures, however, are themselves subject to the pressures on other 
contracted out services.  For example, the funding regime has made 
infrastructure bodies quite timid in the area of employment relations and has 
forced some community-based worker representatives to rebrand themselves 
as voluntary-sector human resource consultancies.  A more effective model  
may be the cluster or consortium, a body narrowly focused on managing the 
relationships between a commissioning body and small providers for a given 
programme, as in the case of Cologne’s consortium.   
 
After more than two decades of increased public-services contracting, the 
landscape of contracted-out welfare-to-work provision is highly unstable, and  
funders, providers, and unions have only begun to develop responses.  The 
workforce faces considerable uncertainty compared to that of the public 
sector.  In the voluntary and private sector organisations we have studied, 
large and small, British and German, trade unions are barely present; where 
they do appear, it is in cases where the employer may have broken the law.   
  
These problems are not unique to the voluntary sector, welfare-to-work 
provision, or to ‘liberal’ countries like the UK.  In most countries and sectors, 
it is probably the case that contracting is disruptive and a bad thing for 
workers.  However, not all contracts are created equal.  In order to really 
understand the effects of marketisation, policy-relevant social science needs to 
continue the search for those features of contracts that make the most different 
in the workplace. 
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